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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UT AH PACKERS, INC. AND UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
-vsTHE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH AND LAWRENCE L. SCRUGGS,

Case
No. 11887

Defendants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a review of the proceedings before the Industrial Commision of Utah, which resulted in an order by the
Commission that the Plaintiffs pay to the Defendant
Lawrence Scruggs temporary-total disability compensation
for a period of time commencing with back surgery performed upon him to and until such time as he may be released to go back to work by his doctors, as well as compensation for permanent disability such as may be determined
thereafter. The award by the Industrial Commission was
based upon the findings of the medical panel that the applicant's basic back pathology resulted from an injury by
accident which occurred during the course of his employment
with the Plaintiff, Utah Packers, Inc., on the 7th day of
July, 1967.
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DISPOSITION BELOW
The Commission awarded compensation based upcn
a finding that the disabling pathology was fully attributable
to an injury sustained by him while in the Plaintiffs employ
but denied compensation for the period of time between the
date of injury and the date of his first surgery.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent agrees with the Industrial Commission's
disposition and award except as to the point in time at
which compensation should have commenced to be paid.
The Respondent-applicant claims the award of the Commission to be inconsistent with the findings of fact and
requests that the period of compensation commence from
the date of injury and continue until he is released for
work by his physician
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Applicant was on the 7th day of July, 1967, a
husky young man twenty-seven years of age, who had
worked for a number of years as a laborer on heavy construction in Northern California. On the date stated he
reported for work at the Plaintiff, Utah Packers, Inc. canning factory where he worked on the night shift to support
himself and family while he attended the Brigham Young
University. Jn process of his employment he was lifting
boxes, each containing six-one gallon cans of canned produce. In lifting a box from the ground (record page 7, 19)
his fellow workers observed him to drop the box in response to sudden onset of back-pain He was unable to stand
or sit and was removed from the cannery by ambulance.
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The Applicant was treated first by Dr. Clark, the
Plaimiff's physician who diagnosed his injury as a "backsprain" a11d referred the Applicant to Dr. Faust, a Chiropractor. After Chiroproctic treatments failed to alleviate
the pain, the Applicant was seen by Dr. Nephi Kezerian, an
orthopedic surgeon, who made a cursory and inconclusive
physical examination (see page 6 of Dr. Kezerian deposition) and eventually the Applicant was granted perm:ssion
to be treated by Charles M. Smith, Jr., another orthopedic
surgeon in Provo, Utah.
Subsequent to neurological and psychiatry examination
done at Dr. Smith's request by Dr.'s Jack L. Tedrow and
Madsen H. Thomas, Dr. Smith placed the Applicant in the
hospital and had a mylogram performed.
On the 8th day of April, 1968, Dr. Smith performed
back surgery with further corrective surgery on DecEmber
6, 1968 (Dr. Holbrook deposition, page 16).
The medical panel report which was filed November
25, 1968, (prior to the second surgery) recounts in detail
all of the medical findings of all of the Doctors and states
(page 5, Medical Panel report) that the applicant had not
been able to work since the time of the injury on July 7,
1967. The findings by the Medical Panel were that there
was a medical probability that the episode at work on
the 7th of July, 1967, created the subsequent totaltemporary disability and the need for surgery, that the
patient had been totally disabled since that time and
that there was no medical evidence of any significant preexisting injury nor was there evidence of any neurosis,
psychosis or personality disorder. Plaintiff objected to the
Medical Panel report and hearing was held on the 10th day
of February, 1969. On February 27, 1969, Plaintiff filed
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a motion to admit into the records of the Industrial Commission, the records of the California Industrial Commis,.ion
relative to a prior Industrial claim made by the Defendant.
The Industrial Commission over objection from the Applicant received the California Industrial Commission papers
in toto on the 21st of March, 1969, and the Hearing Examiner made his findings of fact and an order awarding
temporary-total disability on the 10th day of June, 1969.
Because of patent errors in calculation and upon request
duly made, the Industrial Commission amended the Hearing Examiner's order by an amended order dated July 22,
1969 and a second amended order dated August 27, 1969,
and it is from the second amended order that Plaintiff's
appeal to the Supreme Court was made.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE APPELLANT,
IN REQUESTING A REHEARING WAS ALREADY BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PRIOR TO
THE ENTERING OF THE COMMISSION'S AW ARD.
There is without question a great amount of conflict
in the evidence, which fact was considered in depth by both
the Medical Panel and by the Industrial Commission. The
statements of Dr. Craig Clark, Dr. Faust and Dr. Kezerian,
based on their cursory examinations and treatments would
possibly fail to show a medical probability of connection
between the incident in the Plaintiff's cannery and subsequent back surgery.
The medical conclusions of Dr.
C. M. Smith, Jr. based upon an indepth examination, in-
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eluding neurogical studies, psychiatry examination, a mylo
g-ra:11 and two surgical entrances into the applicant's back
effectively refute any preliminary diagnosis of "mere back
strain." All of these matters were taken into account by
the Medical Panel, resulting in a favorable finding o l the
applicant's claim of injury. Plaintiff's brief quotes from
Dr. Kezerian's report of September 25th, indicating a preliminary diagnosis of a simple strain but ignores Dr.
Kezerian's later sbt.?ment (Kszerian deposition, page 6) :
"I did not make a disability evaluation. And th'3
reason was that I felt that my study was incomplete and limited."
Dr Kezerian on the same page, further states:
"My
is not intended to be conclusive,
and for this reason I insist?d that he 2ee a neurologist or a neuro-surgeon."
Likewise, the records from California proffered by
Plaintiff and considered in full by the Industrial Commission, disclosed that Dr. Rentschler in a letter to the California State Compensation Insurance Fund, dated November
26, 1965, advised hospitalization and further diagnostic
studies. The same Doctor in his letter of February 18, 1966
to Mr. Dahnan of the Claims Department for State Compensation Insurance Fund concluded that there was no neurological function abnormality observable at that time, thus
reversing his own prior diagnosis. This too was considered
by the Industrial Commission prior to the granting of the
award.
This Court has ruled many times that the Industrial
Commission may consider any evidence which comes before
it and as the finder of fact resolve any discrepancies as
they best d2termine (see Morrelly vs. Industrial Commission
et al., number 11547, filed September 22, 1969.) Our statute
provides that the Industrial Commission findings are conclusive and final and not subject to review. (Section 35-
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1-85, UCA, 1953.) If there is substantial evidence to support the findings the Supreme Court will not rever the
Industrial Commission (Vance vs. Industrial Commission,
17 Ut 2d 217, 407 P. 2d 1006 (1965). As recently as December 1, 1969, this Court held in Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. the Industrial Commission, et al., (No. 11645,
filed December 1, 1969 :)
"The Commission having made its findings upon
conflicting evidence, it is the duty of this Court to
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
findings and order of the Commission. As we
view the evidence, while it is widely divergent,
nevertheless there is creditable evidence in the
record to support the Commission findings. We
are not inclined in this case to depart from the
principles announced in numerous prior decisions
by the Court."
The Industrial Commission in the instant case found
in favor of the Applicant after having considered fully the
Medical Panel hearing, the Hearing Examiner's report and
after having allowed into the record all of the hearsay
evidence from California which is by the Appellant now
offered again. It would appear pointless to refer the same
materials back to the Industrial Commission for another
hearing on the same record as requested by the Appellant.
POINT 2
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ITS FAILURE TO AWARD COMPENSATION TO THE
APPLICANT COMMENCING WITH THE DAY OF ACCIDENT INSTEAD OF THE DAY OF THE SURGERY
FROM WHICH DAY THE AW ARD ACTUALLY COMMENCED.
The award of the Industrial Commission was made
pursuant to their adoption of the findings of fact and con-
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of law of Robert J Shaughnessy (Page 5, Hearing
gx;1 niaer's report) which adopted the special medical
µa11el report in that portion finding a reasonable medical
probability that the episode at work on July 7, 1967, created the subsequent total-temporary disability and the need
for surgery. The reason given by the Hearing Examiner for
not adopting the other conclusions and recommendations
of the Medical Panel (last Paragraph, Page 4, Hearing
Examiner report) were that:
"the next independent evidence of total disabilit"r
would occur at the time of the Applicant's hospitalization for surgery-just prior to the hearirg of
April 8, 1969. Any additional temporary totaldisability would commence from that date."
This tends to ignore the Medical Panel evidence on
Page 5 of the Medical Panel report quoting Dr. Smith's
independent report as concluding:
"All of his studies up to the present time have
been consistent with the presence of an Industrial
injury. This is verified not only historically but
clinically and surgically."
And further down the same page the Medical Panel
finds:
"He has not been able to work since the time of
the injury on the 7th day of July, 1967."
This Court has held in Griffin vs. Industrial Commission, 16, Ut. 2d 264, 399 P. 2d 204, and other cases
cited therein:
"The other pertinent issue is whether the Commission should have allowed medical testimony to
prove a connection between the slipping incident
and the present ailment suffered by Plaintiff when
no competent evidence was offered to show injuries
from the slipping incident . . . where the injury
complained of affects the internal anatomy, by
what means but through medical testimony can
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petitioner prove that her ailments were caused
by the accident?
We do not say that the Commission wrongly decided the case. It well established that the Commission can receive any kind of relative evidence,
and it is further established that the commission
is not obliged to believe the Plaintiff's testimony,
unless such belief is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious. But the Plaintiff in this
case should be given the opportunity to introduce
medical testimony in an effort to prove that the
plyboard incident was the proximate cause of her
present ailments."
Applicant states he did not and could not work at any
time since the accident and this was verified medically by
both Dr. Smith and the Medical Panel's conclusions. No
contrary evidence is in the record. Disbelief in face of the
facts would indeed be so unreasonable as to be arbitrary
and capricious.
It should be pointed out that the Hearing Examiner
concluded that Applicant was lying because of the California
papers relating to a prior Industrial accident claim, but
Applicant was denied an opportunity to explain, or to
cross-examine or question those whose records were accepted by the Hearing Examiner as gospel truth. As appears on the California papers, that matter resulted from
a fall in which Applicant's legs and thighs were bruised,
causing temporary pain. The matter was pursued on Applicant's behalf by a union attorney. No hearing of any
kind was held but a settlement was arranged after Applicant
left California. The reason stated in the Compromise and
Release form (P.2) is:
"9. Reason for compromise. The nature and extent of permanent disability being in dispute, the
parties wish to avoid the hazards of litigation."
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Such a compromise makes it apparent that the claim
disposed of merely to close the record and certainly,
as a compromise did not acknowledge any specific injury
to Applicant's back. There was in fact none, as was determined medically by Dr. Smith and verified by the Medical
Panel.
Section 35-1-45 UCA, 1953 provides:
"Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, wheresoever such injury occurred, . . .
shall be entitled to receive, and shall be paid, such
compensation for loss sustained on account of such
injuries or death ... as herein provided."
Section 35-1-65, UCA, 1953, provides
"In case of temporary disability, the employee
shall receive sixty percent of his average weekly
wages so long as such disability is total ... " (Emphasis ours)
This Court has considered the question of when a cause
of action arises under Workman's Compensation laws, as
follows:
"Not until there is an accident and injury and: a
of loss from the injury, does the duty to
pay arise. A mere accident does not impose the
duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does
not impose the duty. But accident plus injury
which results in disability or loss gives rise to the
duty to pay."
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 93, U 510,
74, P.2d 657.
It is submitted then that the record in Applicant's case
shows without equivocation that Applicant was injured
on July 7, 1967, while on the job in Appellant's cannery,
that he was temporarily totally disabled and unable to
work from that time until the present and was under statute, entitled to compensation for that period. Arbitrary
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selection of the date of surgery as the time for starting
compensation would require a different findings of fact than
relied on by the Industrial Commission in making their
award.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission Award should commence
with the date of injury, July 7, 1967.
Respectfully submitted,
MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS &
MCGUIRE
Attorneys for respondent-applicant
28 North 1st East
Provo, Utah 84601
By: Glen J. Ellis

